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ABSTRACT
The so-called freedom of navigation through the Malacca straits and the
South China Sea, some of the world’s busiest trade routes, has long been of
concern to scholars and practitioners of international politics in the region.
Increasing tensions around territorial disputes recently propelled the issue to
the forefront of global foreign and security policy making. Yet, despite the
frequent invocation of threats to the ‘freedom of navigation’ for the justifica-
tion of military measures to protect the ‘liberal rules-based order’, the sub-
stance of this rule or norm remains ambiguous and the nature of the
threatened order unclear. Located at the confluence of the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, Australian discourses represent a suitable case for clarifying both.
Starting from the original provisions on navigational regimes in international
law, this study analyses the meanings that officials, think tank analysts and
academics have been attributing to the freedom of navigation and contextu-
alize them in the evolving debate about order. Focusing on political rather
than legal discourses, it finds that concerns with the freedom of navigation
are largely unrelated to the safety of maritime transport. Instead, they serve
as proxy for an increasingly static imagination of international order – written
backward in time – to be secured.
KEYWORDS Freedom of navigation; Australia; China; US; order
Introduction
Maritime security concerns related to shipping routes through the Malacca
straits ‘chokepoint’ and the South China Sea have become the major drivers
of post-Cold War international politics. Despite that the contestations in the
two geographically distinct areas raise quite different legal and political
questions, the issues of territorial disputes and the safety of maritime
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transport are intertwined, often conflated and therefore hardly separable in
terms of their effects on international relations. Taken together, they are
commonly seen as proof for the fact that rising China is limiting the free
flow of goods at sea and, by consequence, challenging the ‘rules-based
international order’ (DoD, 2016; White House, 2015). Yet, the concern with
the security of the so-called Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) is not
new. In the course of seeking to reorient their foreign and security politics
after the Cold War, Japanese opinion-leaders had come to see the security
of sea lanes through Southeast Asia as a ‘matter of life and death’ for their
economy already in the mid-1990s (Cabinet Secretariat, 1994). The Chinese
leadership, by 2003, found itself facing this ‘Malacca Dilemma’ too (Shi,
2004). At the same time, extra-regional actors such as Australia and the US
who would be among the least affected in the extreme scenario of sea lane
closures (Laurenceson, 2017; Noer & Gregory, 1996), came to attach dispro-
portionate importance to the freedom of navigation (FoN) in the ‘Indo-
Pacific’. China’s large-scale land reclamations from 2014 onwards and an
arbitration tribunal’s award for the Philippine and against the Chinese posi-
tion in the South China Sea from 2016 finally brought the issue to the G-7
leaders’ and EU decision-makers’ attention (G-7, 2015; G-7, 2016; Tusk,
2016), while reinforcing threat perceptions across the Asia-Pacific region
(Turnbull, 2017).
This study seeks to disentangle the drivers of increasing concerns with
the so-called freedom of navigation that lie at the core of regional and
increasingly also global security politics. By clarifying the meaning of FoN
as purported pillar of the global ‘rule-based order’, this research sheds light
on the prevailing conception of international order that is, ostensibly, in
increasing need for protection and defence. By addressing the questions:
whose freedom of navigation, from what danger, and for which purpose?1
the present discussion aims to go beyond the assessment of particular
claims and actions, and complement existing studies that focus on the
Chinese and US roles in challenging and defending international norms
and orders.
Australia, a major regional actor with close economic relations to East
Asia, enduring cultural links to Europe, and strong military ties with the US,
provides a suitable case. This is not only because of its location at the con-
fluence of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, but also because Australia has
no territorial claims in the South China Sea and relies on maritime shipping
routes through these seas overwhelmingly for its trade with China.
1These questions align with analytical perspectives that force us to take a closer look at what
securitizing arguments are all about (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998), and Robert W. Cox (1981, p.
126) broader observation about the generation of knowledge (of world order) when he points out
that even theoretical arguments are always for someone and for some purpose, and wedded to
their time.
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Focusing on political rather than on legal discourses, the study finds that
the Australian concerns with the freedom of navigation such as they are
frequently voiced by government representatives and students of interna-
tional security essentially revolve about the freedom of navigation for war-
ships rather than for commercial shipping. While piracy and terrorism
continue to be seen as major threats to the latter, the challenge of rising
China has come to dominate the discourse as the major threat to the for-
mer. Yet, as the considerably more nuanced assessments on the part of
scholars and maritime policy experts show, the perceived danger is not
direct Chinese actions against Australia or Australia-bound shipping. At
work are diffuse anxieties that the ‘rise of China’, or the rise of ‘Asia’, over-
turns a particular imagined notion of a US-led order that has, ostensibly,
not only guaranteed Australian, but also general regional and global pros-
perity, security and stability for no less than 70 years. Whether intended or
not, this conception of order not only enables continuity in Canberra’s for-
eign and security politics, it also reinforces the Australian state.
To substantiate this argument, the next section outlines the contours of
the academic debate about Australian views of order. The subsequent sec-
tion shows how the developments of the international law of the sea have
affected perceptions of the freedom of navigation through Southeast Asian
seas. The line of argument then proceeds with discussions of Australian
views of the ostensibly legal conception of the freedom of navigation,
before situating the FoN within changing geopolitical ideas about regional
and global orders, including the rise of the ‘Indo-Pacific’. It is then sug-
gested that the Australian equation of the so-called liberal rules based
order with an idealized view of the US-centred order, static and written
back in time, must invariably produce perceptions of challenges and threats
and that it has as much to do with the Australian policy-makers’ difficulties
with coming to terms with approaching ‘Asia’, than with external actors’
behaviour. In conclusion, the finding that the debate about the Chinese
challenge to the FoN and therefore also to the rules-based order is much
more about geopolitics than international law, and also raises the question
what norms and rules of international order are indeed being challenged,
defended and remade.
Australian conceptions of international order
Academics adhere to considerably different conceptions of (international)
order. Political leaders, despite frequent usage, deploy it without much sub-
stantial clarification, instead imbuing it, explicitly or implicitly, with chang-
ing meanings (Bisley, 2016). Thus, it is crucial to remember that ‘the
language of ‘international order’ or ‘global governance’ is never politically
neutral’ (Hurrell 2007, p. 20). In fact, the ‘capacity to produce and project
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proposals, conceptions, and theories of order is a central part of the prac-
tice of power’ (Hurrell, 2007, p. 20). The clearest and most authoritative rep-
resentations of Australian conceptions of order can be found in the 2016
Defence and the 2017 Foreign Policy White Papers. The reports’ thrust is
that the so-called liberal rules-based order, a universally beneficial system
created and led by the US, has come under threat by the shift of power
towards Asia and by the non-democratic assertively rising China in particu-
lar (DoD, 2016, p. 14; GoA, 2017). Zala (2016) critically reflects on the former
document by means of an imaginary email conversation between the late
doyens of post-war Australian international relations scholarship, Hedley
Bull and Coral Bell, with E.H. Carr. Yet, despite Zala’s (2016, p. 442) aptly
points out the report’s ‘magical’ term, the ‘rules-based order’s’ intriguing
vagueness, moral loading and fundamental error to conceive international
law as existing beyond power relations, his protagonists remain caught in
the past. Their debate, similar to the discussions among many of their con-
temporaries, is focussed on great powers and the desirability of a twenty-
first century version of the nineteenth century ‘concert’ among them (Carr,
2018; White, 2011).2 They pay scant attention to the political feasibility, fra-
gility and ethical desirability of such a concert. Apart from the fact that
great power entitlement to respective spheres of influence carries a neoco-
lonial ring and would likely accentuate rather than ameliorate the jockeying
for regional leadership in the making of rules and norms, the debate also
fails to account for the fact that the classical European precursor had been
an alliance among declining aristocratic elites that sought to keep peace
amongst themselves by transposing interstate competition to their overseas
possessions, while guarding against increasing revolutionary pressures at
home, both with disastrous consequences (Halperin, 2004). As we shall see,
this great power-centric conception of order informs the mainstream
Australian debate about the question how much space, if at all, the US
should give to the rising powers, to China in particular. However, assuming
that Australia is external to and merely reacting to the Sino-US rivalry mar-
ginalizes Canberra’s own role in these new power politics, including the
question how Australia’s complicated relationship with ‘Asia’ matters. To
address these shortcomings, methodologically more critical and empirically
less Euro-centric perspectives are insightful.
In their discussion of changes in Canberra’s foreign and security policies
of the 1980s and 1990s, Higgott and Nossal (1997) noted that Australian
policy-makers had been thinking and acting as if they were caught in-
between two worlds: an ‘old’ Anglo-American world of Australia’s nine-
teenth-century origins and twentieth-century development, and a ‘new’
2See also the 2013 special issue ‘The China Choice in Depth,’ Security Challenges, 9(1), 1-49.
Retrieved from https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/ReRothwellsources/Files/SC9-1.pdf
478 C. WIRTH
world of the Asia Pacific. While Australia’s economic integration into East
Asia superseded long-standing links with the imperial England-centred
economy, and the abandonment of the White Australia immigration policy
in the early 1970s signalled cultural adaptation to its neighbourhood, the
‘centrality of Anglo-Saxonism’ (Phillips, 2015, p. 23) not only prevented
Australia from arriving in the new world, it also engendered persistent feel-
ings of vulnerability towards the ‘Asia’. The continuing identification with
the British monarchy – Queen Elizabeth II remains the formal Head of State
– and the replacement of security ties with the British Empire by those with
the US – the Five Power Defence Agreements (FPDA) remain operational
and the Australia-New Zealand-US (ANZUS) alliance is more relevant than
ever – are but the clearest indicators for Australia’s in-between-ness or limi-
nality, and continuing status as ‘odd-man out’ of the East Asian region
(Higgott & Nossal, 2008). The success of Australian initiatives in the 1990s in
creating an East Asian regional space, including through the establishment
of multilateral institutions for trade and security governance, was fleeting.
In fact, even the more progressive Australian Labor Party’s efforts to lessen
the contradictions inherent to being a ‘branch office of empire’ or ‘Western
outpost’3 remain ambiguous, contested (Jones & Benvenuti, 2006) and
prone to arouse political and at times ethnocentric backlashes.4
After assessing Australian engagement in the Global War on Terrorism, a
development that has widely been seen as a manifestation of the changing
global order, Burke similarly concludes that ‘Australia’s approach to security
rests upon an unresolved paradox: it has often been described as ‘one of
the most secure countries in the world’ because of its isolated strategic
location, natural sea barrier and distance from major conflict, yet it has long
harboured deep sense of physical and existential insecurity’ (Burke 2007,
p. 126). Perera (2009) delves deeper into the Australian insular imagination
and its political consequences. She finds that the hegemonic narrative of
Australia’s British origins reinforced through the modern cartographic repre-
sentation of an island-continent and led Australians to think of themselves
as being external to the region: Seeing the world as a whole, separates the
self from it (Perera, 2009, p. 39). Consequently, Australian policy-makers
tend to look at the world out there, overseas, in the binaries of either
opportunities or threats. ‘Fear’ and ‘greed’ simultaneously inform Canberra’s
China and ‘Asia’ policies (Garnaut, 2015). The insecurity that this ideational
distance engenders gives rise to the never-ending search for certainty that
can be found, temporarily, in reified threats or in reified opportunities (Pan,
2012, p. 15). Both kinds of expectations are unrealistic and unstable. Hence,
3Prime Minister Keating cited in Higgott & Nossal (1997), p. 176, and Australian ambassador quoted
in Burke (2007), p. 126, respectively.
4For reactions towards rising Japan in the 1980s and 90s see Morris (2010).
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the persisting insecurities raise the risk that prophecies of confrontation
and conflict become self-fulfilling. Specifically, this cognitive distance or
gap manifests itself in the perception that a secure Australia faces an arc of
instability or insecurity to its north (Perera, 2009). Yet, what is at stake is
not Australia’s territorial integrity or military security, but it is very insularity
(Perera, 2009, p. 105), an insular identity that has been (Phillips, 2015) and,
still is, mobilized for the purpose of the building and reinforcing of the
state. To see how this identity construction relates to the ‘rules-based
order’, it is first necessary to be clear about the rules in question.
The law of the sea’s contested ‘rules and norms’
The entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) in 1994 raised the stakes in territorial disputes while compli-
cating the delimitation of maritime zones and the pertaining rights through
the introduction of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Thereby, UNCLOS indi-
rectly heightened anxieties about the ‘choking’ hazard of the Malacca
Straits due to congestion, pirate attacks and potential interference of hostile
naval forces intervening in territorial disputes. Yet, contemporary political
debates about the rules and norms of the law of the sea remain silent
about the crucial fact that UNCLOS, signed in 1982, is a package deal, which
had been reached between two main groups of states that can roughly be
defined as the developed and the developing countries (Booth, 1985). The
former had long tried to preserve a maximum of their freedom to sail and
explore the seas; the latter sought control over their offshore resources
while safeguarding their often newly gained independence (Anand, 1983).
The prospect for ever-narrowing semi-enclosed5 East Asian seas put this
fundamental contention within the UNCLOS bargain into stark relief. EEZ
give coastal states the sole rights to exploring and exploiting all living and
non-living resources up to 200 nautical miles (NM) from their shores
(UNCLOS 1982, art. 57). Where governments can prove the presence of con-
tinental shelves, these zones can be extended up to 350NM from their
coastlines to a maximum depth of 2500 m (UNCLOS 1982, art. 76). Hence,
the sovereign control over islands, defined as naturally formed land that
remains above water and sustains economic life (UNCLOS 1982, art. 121),
and therefore generate rights to EEZ, brought features such as the Paracel
and Spratly groups at the centre of the South China Sea into spotlight. Yet,
expanding claims to territorial seas and exclusive economic zones, and
5Art. 122 UNCLOS defines a semi-enclosed sea as ‘a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more
States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or
primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States’, and
therefore in art. 123 stipulates special responsibilities for coastal states to cooperate in managing
and ecologically preserving them.
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concomitant rights to enforce provisions for the marine environmental pro-
tection and the regulation of maritime transport, sometimes referred to as
‘creeping jurisdiction’ (Kwiatkowska, 1991a), have been preoccupying
UNCLOS negotiators for decades. Therefore, the developed states made
sure for UNCLOS to codify the freedom of navigation according to the cus-
tomary legal norm based on Mare Liberum, Hugo de Groot’s (Grotius) trea-
tise in defence of the Dutch Empire’s access to Southeast Asia against
Imperial Portuguese and Spanish attempts to monopolize trade routes.
UNCLOS articles 17-19 grant the right to innocent passage through territo-
rial seas to all foreign ships, provided that it is ‘not prejudicial to peace,
good order or security of the coastal state’. However, mostly Euro-Atlantic
developed states, many of which boast strong naval forces, deemed this
provision too restrictive. Their pushback eventually led to a compromise
through the introduction of the transit passage regime (UNCLOS, 1982, art.
37-40). For traffic along sea routes, through straits commonly used for inter-
national navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive eco-
nomic zone and another, the relaxed regime, which does not mandate
submarines to surface and show their flags, would apply (UNCLOS 1982, art.
20). This provision is complemented with the regime of archipelagic sea
lane passage that requires archipelagic states6 to designate sea lanes and
air routes through their waters. If they refrain from doing so, archipelagic
sea lane passage nevertheless applies to those routes that are ‘normally
used for international navigation’ (UNCLOS 1982, art. 53).
In the 1980s and 1990s, the pertaining disagreements between the often
newly independent coastal states on the one hand and extra-regional
(great) powers on the other hand centred on the Philippines and Indonesia.
Both had been refusing to acknowledge several commonly used interna-
tional transport routes and guarantee archipelagic sea lane passage. By the
2000s, however, the contestation between those naval powers favouring
the freedom of navigation for their ships and coastal states interested in
keeping foreign vessels off their (claimed) seas resurfaced in the form of
opposing interpretations of the right to free navigation in exclusive eco-
nomic zones. According to UNCLOS, coastal states’ right to exploit living
and non-living resources within their EEZ precludes foreign vessels from
conducting oceanographic research for that purpose. For Chinese leaders
who established their modern independent state in 1949 and have, on the
background of not too distant historical experiences, long felt vulnerable to
naval powers, this meant that any oceanographic research would require
6According to art. 46 UNLCOS, archipelagic states are comprised of ‘islands, including parts of
islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such
islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political
entity, or which historically have been regarded as such’ (emphasis added).
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prior notice and approval (PRC, 1998). In contrast, the US as the main oper-
ator of government vessels in East Asian seas strictly distinguishes between
exploration activities for economic from those for military purposes. While
critics point to the obligation, according to UNCLOS art. 58, of states to
operate in EEZ with ‘due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal
State,’ Washington argues that the intelligence gathering is permitted as
long as the results are not used for resource exploration (Neher, Pedrozo, &
Roach, 2009). Despite Australian experts’ alarmist reactions when the
Chinese navy did precisely that and observed military exercises from within
the Australian EEZ (thereby revealing its own double standards), Canberra
adheres to the same liberal interpretation (Greene, 2017).
The Sino-US confrontation over interpretations of international law
extends to the skies. It caused one of the biggest crises in post-Tiananmen
Sino-US relations when it led to the mid-air collision of a Chinese fighter jet
with a US reconnaissance plane in April 2001 (Kan et al., 2001). At sea, the
so-called Impeccable incident of 2009 epitomizes this action–reaction cycle.
Then, ‘five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in dan-
gerously close proximity to USNS Impeccable in an apparent coordinated
effort to harass the US ocean surveillance ship while it was conducting rou-
tine operations in international waters [China’s Exclusive Economic Zone]’
(Kan et al., 2001, p. 1). Such incidents are recurrent (Wirth, 2017), and ten-
sions rose to yet another level after media reports in September 2015
showed how China has been reclaiming and guarding large areas around a
number of reefs, rocks and islets in the disputed Spratly group (Sciutto,
2015). In response, the Obama and Trump administrations enhanced the
so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the South China
Sea. In line with long-standing practice (DoD, 2017) and under heightened
public scrutiny, the US Navy sailed warships close to or within the hypo-
thetical territorial seas of China-claimed features (O’Rourke, 2017; Panda,
2017). For Australia, the US’s staunchest ally in the region, this development
accentuated a number of difficult legal and political questions.
Extending maritime territories and zones
Surrounded by the ocean and thus heavily dependent on maritime trans-
port, Australia had been an early and enthusiastic participant in the
UNCLOS negotiations. The birth of new states in the course of the wave of
decolonization, and Great Britain’s retreat from ‘East of Suez’, made the con-
stitution of a new order all the more important. Throughout the 1980s and
in the early 1990s, Australia, by aligning itself with both, those who sought
to preserve maximum freedom to sail the seas and those who sought to
gain control over marine resources and independence, benefitted
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enormously from the ocean enclosure movement embodied in UNCLOS.
Given its strong historical and political ties, that is ‘shared common values’
with the United Kingdom and the US, Australia joined the Western Europe
and Others negotiation group, which favoured unimpeded navigation. Yet,
the Australian position was not singularly focused on the freedom of navi-
gation. Canberra was also keen to extend the reach of its own sovereign
control over marine resources.7 According to Kaye (2015, p. 256) ‘as a State
with an extensive and remote coastline, and a wide continental shelf, it was
clearly in Australia’s interests to pursue the greatest extension of maritime
jurisdiction possible’. Hence, Australian negotiators also played a leading
role in the so-called 13 Broad-shelf States or Margineers Group and, in addi-
tion, participated in the Coastal States Group, which explicitly aimed at
expanding state control over coastal seas while pushing back against the
lobbying of the Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States. Not
least due to claiming 41% of the Antarctic continent, Australia, by 2008, came
to claim ‘rights over more waters than any other nation’ (Woolner, 2008, p. 2).
Still, with the freedom of maritime transport routes their major concern,
Australian representatives supported a pragmatic definition of innocent pas-
sage and succeeded in defending their view on the passage of warships
through territorial seas (Kaye, 2015). At the same time, the minor importance
of fishing for the Australian economy and the vast expanses of Australian seas
meant that questions related to exclusive economic zones, despite being
hotly debated elsewhere, remained relatively uncontentious in Canberra.
This situation changed when national governments started adjusting
their legal frameworks to the UNCLOS’ new spatial ordering of the seas and
thereby exposed the contradiction inherent to the UNCLOS package deal,
including Canberra’s taking advantage of it. Australian representatives pro-
tested vigorously when Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia reiterated
their intentions to retain jurisdiction over their coastal and archipelagic
waters, respectively (GoI, 1983; GoM, 1984, Johnson, 2000; Kwiatkowska,
1991b). In 1992, Beijing adjusted national legislation too and passed the
Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. The Chinese move caused
widespread concern because it not only reiterated and elaborated on pre-
vious claims in the South China Sea, but also included the disputed Diaoyu/
Senkaku East China Sea islets and codified the requirement for foreign
‘military ships’ to seek prior approval before entering China’s EEZ (PRC,
1992). At the same time, the Philippine and Indonesian governments con-
tinued to drag their feet; Jakarta’s designation of a mere three archipelagic
sea lanes, roughly in East–West direction and therefore of limited use for
Australia-bound shipping, has consistently been criticized in Canberra
7Due to their control over vast island territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the Caribbean,
the former imperial powers gained most out of UNCLOS, by far (Nolan, 2013)
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(Forward, 2009). By the late 1990s, however, the Australian focus
shifted northward.
Wrangling over hydrocarbon exploration among the littoral governments
meant that territorial disputes in the South China Sea continued to fester.
After a Philippine plan to conduct a survey off Palawan leaked, the Chinese
government apparently decided to occupy a rock formation also known as
Mischief Reef (Hayton, 2014, ch. 3). The barracks on stilts were discovered in
January 1995 and became an epitome for China’s expansion. This was mainly
a result of the Philippine response: confronted with this fait accompli, the
Ramos government sought to regionalize and internationalize the dispute. In
vain, it tried to invoke the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty (Dzurek,
1996). Yet, this lobbying rekindled fears of rising impediments to the freedom
of navigation. Because, or, despite that observers frequently noted that the
reef lay in the midst of a heavily-frequented shipping route, the Philippines suc-
ceeded in inducing Japan and the US to reiterate their national interests in
the freedom of navigation or security of the so-called sea lanes of communica-
tion (SLOC) (Dzurek, 1996, p. 35). As the disputes among the South China Sea
claimants escalated, the Philippines also managed to get Australia on board:
in 1996 already, the Australian Defence Minister had perceived the Spratly dis-
pute as posing ‘a major threat to regional security’ (Dzurek, 1996, p. 42).
Yet, the Australian government was not immune against the temptation
to control maritime space for the sake of national security. In 2004, fuelled
by fears of terrorist attacks in the wake of 9-11, the Howard government
set out to declare an Australian Maritime Identification Zone, soon to be
renamed ‘System’ (AMIS), under which Australian authorities would require
all non-recreational vessels navigating within 1000NM of the coast to
report their identity and provide details about their journey and cargo
before entering Australian ports (Bateman, 2007; Klein, 2006). Then, in 2005,
the Joint Border Protection Command comprising the Australian Defence
Force and Customs Service was set up, giving the former unprecedented
law enforcement powers (Moore, 2006). After strong protests, especially
from Indonesia and New Zealand – the implementation of the original plan
would have meant that Canberra effectively policed these countries’ seas –
the AMIS seems to rely mostly on the collection and management of elec-
tronic data, while its legal status as maritime zone remains unclear
(Goldrick, 2008, p. 242). Meanwhile, the South China Sea disputes continued
unabatedly and shifted the focus on other states’ efforts to control the seas.
Debating threats to the ‘freedom of navigation’
In the course of a few years, the long-standing contention between the
developed and developing states over the extent of the freedom of the
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seas versus the enclosure of the ocean, inherent to UNCLOS, became
reframed. Specific concerns related to the freedom of navigation were
equated with UNCLOS as a whole, which, in turn, became a proxy for
‘international order’. Paradoxically, this strengthening emphasis on the
‘rules-based order’ went hand in hand with the emptying from meaning of
the already ambiguous term. Concrete problems with international law and
UNCLOS as a whole got marginalized in the heated debates about fre-
quently deployed and therefore increasingly abstract notions of ‘freedom’
and ‘rules-based order’.
Intensifying contestations over territorial control in the South China Sea
stirred Australian anxieties and led to the reaffirmation of Canberra’s
‘strategic interests’ in the region. When, in April 2012, a Philippine naval
vessel’s inspection of Chinese fishing boats near Scarborough Shoal led to a
prolonged stand-off, the then Australian Foreign Minister Carr stated that
Australia does not take sides. Yet, with clear reference to China’s reluctance
to abandon the so-called nine-dash line, an ambiguous and also within
China debated (Wang, 2015) claim to the entire South China Sea, Carr
emphasized that ‘we do, given our interest in the South China Sea, given
the fact that a large proportion of our trade travels through it, [… ] call on
governments to clarify and pursue those claims and accompanying mari-
time rights in accordance with international law including the UN Law of
the Sea Convention’ (BBC, 2012). Subsequently, the Liberal opposition party
and a number of strategists called upon the government to become more
active in resolving the dispute, because ‘the South China Sea is Australia’s
single point of greatest strategic vulnerability’ (Callick, 2012).
Meanwhile, Beijing continued to raise tensions when it established
Sansha City as a political entity with formal jurisdiction over disputed
waters (Callick, 2012). The reason why Australia should be worried and
become involved more strongly, according to one major newspaper, is the
fact that Sansha City sits right at the centre of a ‘freight freeway’, through
which ‘two-thirds of Australia’s exports and almost half of its imports, about
$273 billion worth of goods, are carried through the South China Sea’
(Callick, 2012). Just as Carr’s earlier assertion and countless official reitera-
tions of it, the article did not mention that this trade is mostly between
Australia and China and that Beijing itself increasingly anxious about its so-
called ‘economic lifelines’ would have scant interest in disrupting them
(Laurenceson, 2017; Noer & Gregory, 1996).
An apparent next step in China’s strategy to control what its leaders
regard as theirs, and not Japan’s, Beijing in November 2013, declared an Air
Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea. Foreign
Minister Bishop (2013) made clear the Australian ‘opposition to any coercive
or unilateral actions to change the status quo’, while calling in the Chinese
THE PACIFIC REVIEW 485
ambassador for further explanation. This led to a spat with China and
brought the strengthening defence ties of the Abbott with the Abe govern-
ment of Japan into focus (McGrath, 2013). At the same time, mostly due to
fears that the ADIZ’ curtailing of the freedom of overflight might establish a
precedent, calls for Australian FONOPS through the newly established ADIZ
and public demonstrations of ‘support for allies who do so to avoid the
emergence of a new status quo where China rules its surrounding seas’
became louder (Slevison, 2015). Assertions that ‘inaction has the potential
to encourage China to declare a South China Sea ADIZ in the foreseeable
future’ (Slevison, 2015) added urgency.
The revelation in September 2015 that China had been reclaiming land
and building large facilities on several disputed rocks and reefs in the
Spratlys caused widespread consternation and unsurprisingly provoked
strong criticism. While asserting Australia’s ‘legitimate interest in the main-
tenance of peace and stability in this part of the world, including the pres-
ervation of respect for international law, unimpeded trade and freedom of
navigation’, the Australian Minister of Defence expressed ‘opposition to any
coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo’ in the South or East
China sea, including ‘any large-scale land reclamation activity’ and the pros-
pect of the artificial structures’ militarisation (Andrews, 2015). This rekindled
talk about the possibility that the Abbott government would send a surveil-
lance plane over these facilities, thereby conducting Australia’s own
FONOPS. Rory Medcalf (2015), a prominent proponent of a moderately
assertive stance, also known for his advocacy of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ geopoliti-
cal concept, argued that ‘Australia cannot pretend that what happens in
the South China Sea is none of its business’ because:
As a middle power, Australian security ultimately depends on a rules-based
regional order … Damage to that order through coercion or unilateral
assertiveness as we have seen in these contested waters in recent years,
equates with damage to Australian interests. Australia’s lifelines, its trade
routes to and from some of its top trading partners, including China but
also Japan and South Korea, run through or close to those waters – as do
the sea lanes on which the commerce of much of the world depends.
Yet, Hugh White, a former defence official well known for his advocacy
of a new, the so-called concert of powers giving China more and better
seats at the tables of world politics, pointed out that it was not clear
whether China’s land reclamations were a threat to the FoN or to interna-
tional law and that the confrontations resulted from the US and China com-
peting over primacy in the Asia-Pacific. For him, the debate was about the
US and Australia trying to figure out whether or not and how to use these
islands as a means to draw a ‘red line’ for China’s growing regional influ-
ence (White, 2015). Similarly, Sam Bateman (2015a), a former naval officer
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and one of the foremost experts on Asia-Pacific maritime affairs,
opined that:
Australia’s direct national interests aren’t involved with overflight in the
South China Sea in the same way as they are with navigation and overflight
through the [Indonesian and Philippine] archipelagos to our near North.
Furthermore, China hasn’t made clear which restrictions on navigation and
overflight it’s imposing around features it occupies in the South China Sea.
… As well as provoking China, that gesture would be seen in the region as
Australia simply acting once again as a ‘deputy sheriff’ to the US in
the region.
In line with legal experts at the US Naval War College (Dutton & Kardon,
2017), Bateman also pointed out that the issue is politically and legally
rather complex because: US FONOPS in that area seemed to focus only on
Chinese actions; the legal status of the challenged features – some installa-
tions would only have 500m safety zones, others, classified as mere rocks
only constitute 12NM territorial seas, etc. – is unclear; most features are
claimed by several coastal states, naval presence in territorial seas my vio-
late the laws on innocent passage, and because FONOPS risk provoking
dangerous maneuvers that may endanger the safety of seafarers if not per-
formed at the highest levels of seamanship (Bateman, 2015b). Indeed, a
year later, an arbitration panel in The Hague denied several of the features
claimed by China and patrolled by the US the legal status of a ‘rock’, and
thereby ruled that they would not even be entitled to a 12NM territorial
sea (PCA, 2016, p. 472). The US had been engaging in some sort of legal
shadow-boxing.
The judges’ differentiated reasoning on a limited set of legal questions
notwithstanding the award had a profound impact on the political debate.
As Nick Bisley (2016) had already pointed out before it was handed down,
the general mood was that ‘something must be done’ against the expand-
ing Chinese presence in the South China Sea. Despite that most experts
deemed their legal utility at best unclear (Raymond, 2016), and the pros-
pect of rising tensions assured, this something was Australia’s own or par-
ticipation in Washington’s FONOPS programme. In particular, exponents of
the Labor opposition deemed the government’s policy of continuing rou-
tine surveillance operations (Greene, 2018) and enhanced bilateral and mul-
tilateral naval diplomacy insufficient (Massola, 2016). Strikingly, these
arguments for a more ‘robust’ military posture, while triggered by Chinese
violations (specific interpretations) of UNCLOS, were not made with refer-
ence to international law, but to geopolitics.
Medcalf’s (2016, p. 10) just as the Defence Minister’s concerns with the
FoN seemed to rest foremost with alliance politics that is a particular notion
of international order, when pointing out that it was the joint Australian-
US-Japanese condemnation of Chinese actions that mattered most, noted
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that ‘the tensions in the South China Sea are testing American resolve, cred-
ibility and diplomatic dexterity’ and that ‘the United States is the ally on
which Australian security deeply depends, and therefore, these are tests for
Australia too’ (Medcalf, 2015). Rothwell (2017) was even clearer in this
when he stated that the US FONOPS’ first ‘primary purpose’ is ‘to protect
the mobility of US forces and to ensure that they can move freely between
oceans, which has been critical for the maintenance of US naval hegemony’
and that ‘Australia wouldn’t wish to be constrained in its naval movements
in coming to the aid of regional friends and allies because of China’s posi-
tion on warship navigation through the South China Sea’. In fact, the ways
in which they are conducted, FONOPS could well produce the opposite of
the intended effects, also in terms of coastal states’ compliance with
UNCLOS and the recognition of territorial claims (Bateman, 2017;
White, 2017).
This prevalence of geopolitics explains the vast exaggeration of the
importance of ‘Indo-Pacific’ sea lanes for the Australian and the US econ-
omy, for instance by the defence minister (Andrews, 2015). Since US-bound
commerce is, at best, marginally reliant on Southeast Asian waterways and
since Australia relies on them only for a fraction of its trade, overwhelm-
ingly for iron ore and coal exports from Western Australia – to the very
China that is supposed to threaten them (Laurenceson, 2017) – the asser-
tion of the FoN in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ cannot but refer to the FoN for war-
ships. After all, this geographical term had long been standing for the
theatre of operation of the US Pacific Command, which was renamed US
Indo-Pacific Command in June 2018. Moreover, the ‘Indo-Pacific’ brings
together India, Australia, Japan and the US, whose ‘shared democratic val-
ues’, according to the then Commander US Pacific Command, place them
best to safeguard ‘freedom, justice and the rules-based system’ at the
present ‘inflection point in history’ (Harris, 2017). In short, China had
become an imminent threat to the established ‘liberal rules-based order’
(Wroe, 2016). To clarify the nature of that order, to understand why
Australian authorities see it worth defending with military force, it is neces-
sary to put the notion of order into the broader historical and security polit-
ical context.
Debating changes and challenges to international order
East Asian seas have long been of interest to Australian policy-makers. Yet,
through the invocation of threats to the FoN as recent reframing of sea
lane security, the post-Cold War discourse reveals a deepening linkage
between maritime disputes and geopolitically defined notions or order.
Consequently, international order has been portrayed as in need and
488 C. WIRTH
amenable for defence by military means, the increasing use of attributes
such as ‘rules-based’, ‘norms’, ‘liberal’ and ‘freedom’ notwithstanding. This
development went hand in hand with the geographical expansion of strate-
gic interests. Since the Imperial Japanese forces’ heavy bombing of Darwin
and midget submarine intrusions into Sydney harbour, the main concern
had been the prevention – and pre-emption – of hostile forces’ overcoming
of the so-called air-sea gap and establishing bridgeheads on Australian soil.
The fears about a resurgent Japan and the spread of communism induced
Australia and New Zealand to seek formal security guarantees from the
United States, which led to the conclusion of the 1951 ANZUS alliance
treaty (DoS, undated). Thus, defence planners have consistently asserted
that ‘the ability to protect our maritime and air approaches is fundamental
to our sovereignty and security’ (DoD, 1987, p. 1). Geographically, the loca-
tion and delineation of these ‘approaches’ remain ambiguous. Yet, the use
of the term suggests an operational definition that excludes the Malacca
straits and the South China Sea.8
By way of its ‘old world’ military ties, however, Australian interests
reached significantly beyond the air-sea gap that separates Australia from
‘Asia’ and the rest of the world. As the 1987 Defence White Paper explains,
‘the United States gains information important to its global maritime intelli-
gence system from Australian surveillance and intelligence gathering activ-
ities in an area extending from the eastern Indian Ocean to the South-West
Pacific’ (DoD, 1987, p. 4). This mainly refers to Operation Gateway that the
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has been conducting, foremost against
the Soviet presence in Vietnam, out of Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia.
Canberra maintains access to this location through the Five Powers
Defence Agreements (FDPA), which had been established among the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore after the
withdrawal of the British from ‘East of Suez’ in the late 1960s, until the
present day. Still under the impression of the partial troop withdrawal from
East Asia following President Nixon’s Guam doctrine, they emphasized that
the alliance
provides us with confidence that assistance would be forthcoming in the
event of substantial military attack on Australia or its direct interests.
Moreover, United States action would be most unlikely to await the
emergence of a major threat. The dramatic strategic changes that would
precede such a threat would inevitably impinge on important interests the
United States has in the region (DoD, 1987, p. 26), emphasis added).
8Among other documents, the indicative coverage of the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) Jindalee
Operational Radar Network over-the-horizon radar suggests a focus that includes most of the
Indonesian archipelago and Papua (RAAF, Undated).
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In short, Australia’s security has been perceived as constituted by the US
military presence in the region, and US perceptions of impending threats
served as a kind of early warning system for strategic and tactical threats to
Australia. In this context, the East and South China Seas have been of indi-
rect interest to Australian officials.
The end of the global Cold War affected this perception in that it
accorded more weight to multilateral institutions complementing the alli-
ance. The 1994 Defence White Paper, somewhat ambiguously, if not contra-
dictorily, asserts that:‘alliances, regional links and global security
arrangements enhance our security environment by making attacks on
Australia less likely’, and, at the same time, ‘contribute to efforts to mini-
mise the role of armed force in international affairs and establish credible,
rules-based regimes for conflict resolution’ (DoD, 1994, pp. 3 and 194,
emphasis added). While maintaining the focus on the air and sea
approaches and striving to continue the Australian military presence in
Malaysia, territorial disputes in the South China Sea were briefly mentioned
as an ongoing source of regional tensions. Yet, the White Paper emphasized
the for a middle power particularly important role of international organiza-
tions for conflict prevention, management and resolution as they foster an
‘orderly international system in which agreed norms of conduct constrain
the use of force’ (DoD, 1994, p. 16).
This liberal institutionalist perspective also informed the Australian
approach to China, which re-emerged as a major actor on the stage of
international politics: ‘As with other regional countries, we seek a better
understanding of China’s strategic perceptions and intentions, and …
encourage China to participate fully in regional and other multilateral secur-
ity discussions’ (DoD, 1994, p. 91). However, conform with the structural
realist emphasis on military power, the US-Australia alliance gained in
importance too, because it provided the stable ground from where
Australian policy-makers sought to manage the shifting international order:
‘Increasingly, as we seek security in and with Asia, we will value our alliance
with the United States not just for the contribution it makes to Australia’s
own defence, but also for its broader contribution to regional security’
(DoD, 1994, p. 95, emphasis added). Accordingly, enduring ‘shared values’,
written back in time, replaced the common Soviet threat as a legitimating
argument: ‘The relationship, however, is founded on our shared interests in
a stable and secure Asia-Pacific region and values and traditions which pre-
date the Cold War and will endure long after it’ (DoD, 1994, p. 95).
By the year 2000, however, concerns about great power conflict grew
and Australian officials started to emphasize the stabilizing role of the US,
not only for upholding global security order alongside the UN, but also for
securing regional stability, that is, the ‘Asia Pacific security system’ (DoD,
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2000, p. 10). As a consequence of this increasingly discernible bipolar vision,
Washington’s other Asia-Pacific alliances came into focus, and the strategic
gaze extended beyond the traditional horizon of the maritime approaches.
According to the White Paper, ‘the strength of US security commitments to
Japan, and the scale of US military deployments in Northeast Asia, which
the US-Japan relationship facilitates, is critical to maintaining strategic
stability in the whole region’ (DoD, 2000, p. 18). Against the defining experi-
ence with Imperial Japanese invasion attempts and the related mythmaking
around the Battle of the Coral Sea that underpins the US-Australian defence
relationship, Canberra’s acknowledgement of Japan’s new role signified an
important shift. Moreover, in this fluid international order, the Australia-US
alliance ‘founded on enduring shared values, interests and outlook, as well
as common sacrifices that extend back almost a century,’ and imbued with
‘renewed vigour,’ provided a stable reference point (DoD, 2000, p. 34).
Conversely, China came to be seen as a potential threat to regional stability
and, by consequence, also to Australian security: ‘We would be concerned
about any major external threat to the territorial integrity of the nations in
our nearer region, especially in maritime Southeast Asia, whether that
threat came from outside or inside the region’ (DoD, 2000, p. 31) and the
‘ability to operate freely in our surrounding oceans, and to deny them to
others’, came to be seen as critical for the defence of Australia (DoD, 2000,
pp. 87-88). Albeit implicitly, the Australian Department of Defence had
introduced its own the so-called Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrine,
a strategy that is often ascribed to Chinese efforts at keeping rival military
forces from operating in the East China Sea (Fravel & Twomey, 2014).
The rise of the ‘Indo-Pacific’
By 2009, perceptions of the strategic environment had changed insofar as
India emerged as a stabilizing force on the strategic landscape. Amid
Washington’s continued entanglements in Middle Eastern quagmires, and
some doubts about the Australian role in it, the ‘end of the so-called unipo-
lar moment; the almost two-decade-long period in which the pre-eminence
of our principal ally, the United States, was without question’ (DoD, 2009, p.
9), appeared on the horizon. Thus, the explicit and diplomatically provoca-
tive question: ‘Will the United States continue to play over the very long
term the strategic role that it has undertaken since the end of World War
II?’ (DoD, 2009, pp. 32–33). Consequently, the overall impression was that of
an increasingly multipolar global order emerging. This entailed an optimis-
tic, inclusive outlook on China, whose ‘political leadership is likely to con-
tinue to appreciate the need for it to make a strong contribution to
strengthening the regional security environment and the global rules-based
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order’ (DoD, 2009, p. 34, emphasis added). At the same time, however,
defence planners attributed the Indian Ocean with greater strategic signifi-
cance as ‘global trading thoroughfare, particularly for energy supplies
between Asia and the Middle East,’ and expected it to ‘join the Pacific
Ocean in terms of its centrality to our maritime strategy and defence
planning’ (DoD, 2009, p. 37). After all, India, due to perceived shared demo-
cratic values, has consistently been portrayed as an important partner for
Australia, including for ‘combating regional and global terrorism and main-
taining a rules-based global security order’ (DoD, 2009, p. 96).
In the face of these perceived historical changes, the term rules-based
order gained currency, while the security–political discourse simultaneously
built up and began to project backward in time, a particular notion of
order. The 2009 White Paper is the first to include an entire section elabo-
rating why and how a ‘stable, rules-based global security order’ must be
preserved (DoD, 2009, pp. 43–44). Although the United Nations and the UN
Charter formally remained central components of this rules-based order,
the report asserted that it is the ‘global leadership role played by the
United States since the end of World War II’ which has ‘provided the strate-
gic underpinning for the post-war global order’ (DoD, 2009, p. 44, emphasis
added). Still, the rise of ‘Asia’ necessitated a more comprehensive debate
about the future of foreign and security policy.
In 2012, Prime Minister Rudd’s Labor government took a proactive step
and commissioned a White Paper addressing the long-standing question
how Australia can find its place in the impending Asian Century. The report
rested on the premise that the economic growth and broadening interna-
tional interests of ‘Asia’s large powers, especially China and India, are
changing the established strategic order’ while existing regional strategic
tensions such as North Korea’s nuclear program and unresolved territorial
disputes remain; Australia’s strategic landscape was seen as ‘becoming
more crowded and complex’ (GoA, 2012, p. 7). Consequently, Canberra
would ‘continue to support a greater role for Asian countries in a rules-
based regional and global order’ (GoA, 2012, p. 3). The envisioned pathways
consisted, among others, of the promotion of fair representation for Asian
nations in key international organisations and their encouragement to be
part of, and help shape, these rules-based institutions; support for China’s
participation in the region’s strategic, political and economic development,
and working with the United States to ensure that it continues to have a
strong and consistent presence in the region, ‘with our alliance contributing
to regional stability, security and peace’ (GoA, 2012, p. 23, emphasis added).
Thus, the dynamic and inclusive view of the ‘international system estab-
lished after World War II’ (GoA, 2012, p. 72) as it brought about the ‘longest
and most prosperous period of peaceful expansion ever witnessed’ would,
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in principle, allow for the accommodation of both Chinese and Allied inter-
ests. In practice, however, the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper
not only glossed over the serious armed conflicts that were fought in the
name of preserving that very order; the hot wars in Korea and Indochina,
large-scale violence in Indonesia and Cambodia, and the looming mutually
assured nuclear destruction. It also assumed that this post-WWII order has
been and remained in itself consistent, unchanging and generally accepted
among the established (‘Western’) powers. It neither accounted for the crit-
ical views that existed toward the United Nations system, including during
the Global War on Terrorism campaigns and in the US Senate’s refusal to
ratify UNCLOS, nor for the generally occurring instrumentalization of inter-
national laws and institutions on the part of powerful states.
The actual idea of a new order that the White Paper Australia in the
Asian Century brought up was neither entirely new, nor embodying
‘inclusive, rules-based systems’ such as it promoted them in places other
than Australia (GoA, 2012, p. 205). To be sure, the idea of the ‘Indo-Pacific’
can be seen as novel in that it rebalances the Australian strategic outlook
from the Pacific toward the Indian Ocean, thus acknowledging the impor-
tance of India as a major future player (Medcalf, 2014). Yet, in raising the
possibility that the ‘importance of the lines of energy supply’ makes the
two oceanic spaces form a ‘strategic arc’ (GoA, 2012, p. 74), the ‘Indo-
Pacific’ concept revived a geopolitical idea that had existed since the 1930s
(Haushofer, 1938). Its contemporary usage is conspicuous because it explic-
itly seeks to align a particular set of procedurally democratic states in their
quests to promote their respective far-reaching naval interests (Pan, 2014).
The subsequent reference to the South China Sea and ‘maritime parts of
Northeast Asia’, combined with a focus on Chinese compliance, situates the
Australian interpretation of international law within the ‘Quad’ of like-minded
states that co-constitutes Indo-Pacific geopolitics (GoA, 2012, pp. 236/237).
This ambiguity, if not contradiction, in how Australian policy-makers
approached rising ‘Asia’ came to the fore more clearly in 2013. After the
Australia in the Asian Century White Paper made the case for Asia engage-
ment and a recalibration of foreign and defence policies, the publication of
the National Security Strategy, one year later, signified a strong pushback.
The definition of ‘Australia’s place in the world’ underpinning the strategy
left no doubt about where the fault lines of international politics lie:
‘Australia is a liberal democracy with deeply held values. … These values
influence our foreign and defence policy. Our values underpin our reputa-
tion as a responsible member of the international community, committed
to a rules-based global order’ (DoPC, 2013, p. 7). More precisely, ‘we have a
fundamental interest in global rules and institutions that prevent conflict,
effectively manage security threats and support the free flow of people,
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goods, services, ideas, capital and principles’ (DoPC, 2013, p. 20).
Marginalizing other dimensions and alternate forms of order, Australia-US
military cooperation was portrayed as the sine qua non:
The value of the Alliance lies not simply in its defence aspects. It
strengthens our prosperity as well as our security. The United States is
integral to global economic growth and security, and provides the critical
underpinning to the rules-based order that exists today (DoPC, 2013, p. 22).
Revealing the bipartisan nature of these ideas, the 2016 Defence White
Paper, written under the auspices of the Liberal Party government,9 built
on this notion of the rules-based order:
The growing prosperity of the Indo-Pacific and the rules-based global order
on which Australia relies for open access to our trading partners are based
on the maintenance of peace and stability. Over the last 70 years that peace
and stability has been underpinned by a strong United States presence in
our region and globally as well as active engagement by regional states in
building a rules-based order (DoD, 2016, p. 14, emphasis added).
Unlike previous defence White Papers, however, the 2016 edition explicitly
mentioned territorial disputes between claimants in the East China and South
China Seas as sources of instability that necessitated a reassessment of
Australia’s defence policy. In addition, the White Paper also pointed to China’s
unruly behaviour, not just in terms of FoN, but also in other global commons
like the cyber and outer space domains. Defence planners understood these
frictions, which they perceive as mostly occurring between the US and China,
as challenges to the rules-based order, an order that is explicitly defined as
the ‘broad architecture of international governance which has developed
since the end of the Second World War’ (DoD, 2016, p. 45). In other words, the
more change Australian policy-makers perceived, the stronger their inclina-
tion to imagine a pre-existing static notion of order in need for stabilization.
Imagined stability and attempts to arrest change
The heightened anxieties that resulted from perceived challenges to the
imagined 70-year-old stable order gave rise to intensified search for and
stronger emphasis of conservative ideas about Australianness while produc-
ing outflow onto foreign and security political strategizing. From the 2017
Foreign Policy White Paper in particular, it becomes apparent that the gov-
ernment’s concern with the liberal rules-based order – according to the
Prime Minister, Australia is facing the ‘most complex and challenging geo-
strategic environment since the early years of the Cold War’ – stems in large
9See also the statements by the representatives of the Coalition Government (Bishop, 2016), the
Labor opposition (Plibersek, 2016) and the Green Party (Ludlam, 2016) opposition. Only the Greens’
position diverts markedly.
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parts from the perception that ‘Australian values’, including ‘our way of life,’
are being threatened by global change such as ‘continued dynamism and
growth in Asia’ (GoA, 2017, pp. iii and v, emphasis added). As he and the
foreign minister asserted, the government must remain committed to those
values in order not to continue loosing ‘confidence’ in their nation’s pros-
perous future. But while the White Paper warns about the challenges to the
‘international rules designed to help maintain peace and minimise the use
of coercion’, it nevertheless prescribes means of coercion as primary tools
for upholding this peaceful order when stating that ‘Australia’s security is
maintained primarily through our own strength, our alliance with the
United States and our partnerships with other countries’ (GoA, 2017, p. 24).
Despite denying to impose values on others, the White Paper explicitly
asserts that Australian ‘national power’ and the alliance with the US, whose
interests are understood as inherently congruent with the international
order, are instrumental for securing ‘liberal institutions, universal values,
and human rights’ such as they ‘serve to advance our national interests’,
worldwide (GoA, 2017, pp. 2 and 11).
Australian policy-makers reconcile these tensions among conflicting
views and rival agents of order, such as they surfaced most visibly when
the UN Security Council did not approve the US-led invasion of Iraq in
2003, through a geographical conception of interlocked strategic interests:
‘a stable rules-based global security order increases the likelihood of strate-
gic stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which in turn makes more likely the
maintenance of a secure immediate neighbourhood and ultimately a secure
Australia’ (DoD, 2009, p. 45). In an unambiguous reference to the Cold War
era when the ‘indivisibility of freedom’ (Weldes 1999, p. 43) provided an all-
encompassing cognitive framework for engaging the world out there, over-
seas, Canberra maintains an indivisible conception of security and of order.
This view of international order is not only unusual because its inscription
of continuity, from the 1950s to the present, runs counter to the conven-
tional understanding of the Sino-US rapprochement of the 1970s and the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 as epochal geopolitical, and the adop-
tion of capitalism in China as monumental political economic turning
points. This view of order linked to Australian security is also problematic
because it invariably requires the securing of world order as a whole. In
times of rapid change, however, change may be characterized, any static,
and indivisible conception of order will inevitably be challenged or threat-
ened. Since these threats are first detected and defined – if not caused – by
security agencies, the military dimension of order occupies front and centre
of the cognitive horizon. Thus, the foreign and security–political discourse
marginalizes alternate conceptions of order and change, including interpre-
tations of China’s rise: as the world’s factory and the world consumer, its
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demand for vast amounts of Australian coal and iron ore may well have been
securing the heavily resource-export dependent country’s prosperity and
social stability – the ‘Australian way of life’ – not only but especially during the
1997 Asian Financial and the 2008 Global Financial Crises.
In that threats such as those to the FoN pillar of the ‘post-WWII strategic
order’ (Bishop, 2016, p. 454) maintain Australia’s relative ideational distance
from approaching ‘Asia’, they perpetuate its insularity. An insularity which,
in turn, mandates attachment to the US as the ‘leader of the free world’
(Farnsworth, 2011; Gillard, 2011) and enables striking continuity in
Australian foreign and security politics:
The Government is [i.e. remains] committed to working with the United
States and like-minded partners to maintain the [70 years-old] rules-based
order by making practical and meaningful military contributions where it is
in our interest to do so. Australia has a long history of contributing to
international efforts to maintain the rules-based global order [including the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, etc.] and
address shared security challenges including the threat of terrorism and
state fragility (DoD, 2016, p. 46).
This insight explains why Australian authorities are preoccupied with the
Chinese threat to ‘peace and stability, respect for international law, unim-
peded trade and freedom of navigation and overflight’ in the ‘Indo-Pacific’
(DoD, 2016, p. 57), despite that Australian national interests defined in
terms of its territorial integrity and economic prosperity are not at stake,
and despite that geopolitical competition weakens international law and
hampers peaceful dispute resolution.
The temporal mismatch that, not always but often, exists between
Chinese actions and rising Australian threat perceptions corroborates this
finding. While the central tenets of the rules-based order and its challenge
through the emergence of China (and India) appeared explicitly in the 2009
Defence White Paper, the cognitive framework for the interpretation of
Chinese actions in the maritime sphere not only predates the escalation of
the South China Sea disputes between 2012 and 2014. Australia’s the so-
called legitimate interest in the South China Sea has its roots in Cold War
security politics, and the concern with the FoN for Australian warships in
the context of the changing international order can be traced back at least
as far as the defence White Paper of 2000 (DoD, 2000, pp. 87/88). In other
words, the prevailing views of order, including the rules and norms that
constitute it, are of a distinctly subjective nature.
Conclusion
If we seek to better understand the competing conceptions of order, per-
ceived challenges to those orders and pertaining policy responses, the
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relational and subjective nature of order requires us to re-politicize interna-
tional law. That is, we have to recognize the historical context as well as the
inherently political character of the making, maintenance and unmaking of
legal rules and norms. The prime example is Grotius’s seminal Mare
Liberum, which he had published in 1609 to defend the Dutch Imperial
fleet’s freedom to sail, trade and police the Indian and Pacific Oceans, that
is, to assert the naval power’s ‘freedom of navigation’ in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ of
the time. Others, like the Englishman John Selden with his Mare Clausum
and the Portuguese Serafim de Freitas in De iusto imperio Lusitanorum
Asiatico [On the Just Empire of the Portuguese in Asia], responded in kind.
The political nature of the so-called rules-based order becomes apparent in
the fact that the Freedom of Navigation as one of its ostensible principal
pillars, in practice, refers to the freedom of navigation for a specific
country’s warships; in that the Chinese threat to the FoN mainly stands for
a rather diffuse ‘Asian challenge’, and in that upholding the Freedom of
Navigation essentially refers to the perpetuation by military means of the
idealized (imagined) prosperous and universally beneficial US-led ‘Western’
dominance that justifies specific Australian foreign and security political
practices and undergirds a particular form of the state
This insight is corroborated by the continuity in how Australian officials
have been defining security political imperatives over the last three deca-
des. In particular, the logic that ‘a stable rules-based global order serves to
deal with threats before they become existential threats to Australia, and ena-
bles our unfettered access to trading routes, secure communications and
transport to support Australia’s economic development’ from 2016 (DoD,
2016, p. 70, emphasis added), bears striking resemblance with the assertion
in the 1987 Defence White Paper that ‘the vitality of our alliance relation-
ship with the United States [… ] provides us with confidence that assis-
tance would be forthcoming in the event of substantial military attack on
Australia or its direct interests,’ and that ‘the United States action would be
most unlikely to await the emergence of a major threat’ (DoD, 1987, p. 26,
emphasis added). In other words, the rules-based order is not only synony-
mous with the Australia-US alliance relationship and US primacy more gen-
erally. Since this alliance system will ‘deal with threats before they become
existential’ to Australia, it may also well be the case that the rules-based
order, in fact (co)produces the very threat it is thought to prevent. What is
more, by glossing over the epochal transformations in the last 70 years, the
end of the global Cold War, the emergence of capitalist China as world fac-
tory and consumer, the rise (and fall) of regional projects, and the fragility
of the financialized global economy in particular, the quest to secure the
rules-based order has potential to, at least partially, recreate the second
pole of the Cold War era, that is the ‘non-Western’ bloc, which got lost in
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the Soviet/Russian and Chinese transformations and keeps on challenging
long-standing Australian worldviews by way of its very absence.
Albeit Australian representations are some of their clearest manifesta-
tion, the larger question remains why Cold War-era mental maps of the
‘West’ and their solidification in formal institutions have largely endured
beyond the epochal changes of the 1990s and continue to cause tensions
among other capitals of the Asia-Pacific. This includes the persistence of
mirror images among those decision-makers, like the Chinese leadership,
who see themselves facing this monolithically perceived ‘West’. Moreover,
the finding that various state actors promote their very own conceptions of
rules-based orders by deploying universalist conceptions of norms, which
are only loosely related to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, raises
the questions whether and what new rules, norms and orders may indeed
emerge from strategies that further national power and contestations over
expanded spheres of influence.
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